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What are they thinking?  Considerations underlying negotiators’ 
ethical decisions 
 
ABSTRACT  
Mismatched ethical expectations between international business negotiators are one of the biggest 
barriers to bridging the communication gap that exists.  Using inappropriate tactics can hinder the 
negotiation process and cause breakdown.  Despite this, there is scant understanding of what negotiators 
think about in their choice of tactics.  This paper extends current understanding of ethical decision making 
in negotiation by presenting a study that uses multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) analysis of Australian 
negotiators’ ratings of appropriateness of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics.  Four dimensions that 
underlie these ratings are identified.  These are the immediacy of impact of the tactic; the impression using 
the tactic gives to the other party; the level of emotional commitment required to execute a tactic; and, 
how clearly the intended signal will be received by the other party.  Likely cross-cultural differences in 
these dimensions and their influence on perceptions of appropriateness of ethically ambiguous negotiation 
tactics are discussed.  This information can be used by negotiators to help them decide which tactics to 
avoid in their international business negotiations and which tactics will not damage the bridge being built 
by the negotiators to bring them together.   
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Introduction 
With increasing volumes of international trade and increasing frequency of cross-cultural 
encounters, competence in international negotiations has become one of the most important and 
indispensable skills for international business people (Simintiras & Thomas, 1998).  Yet international 
negotiations often fail (Gulbro & Herbig, 1996) because the negotiating parties have different perceptions 
about the decision-making situation (George, Jones, & Gonzalez, 1998).  One particular area that can 
cause dismay, and indeed negotiation breakdown, is mismatched standards about what constitutes 
appropriate negotiating behaviour.  When a negotiator uses a tactic that the other party considers unethical 
the perpetrator can feel discomfort, personal stress or even guilt, and the receiver is likely to be angry, 
embarrassed and most victims are likely to seek retaliation and revenge (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 
1999).  With such potent responses, it is little wonder that use of an ‘unethical’ tactic can cause a 
negotiation to falter and the bridge, being built by the negotiators to bring them together, to collapse.  
Thus, it is important that international negotiators are armed with an understanding of cultural differences 
of what constitutes and acceptable or unacceptable tactic.  Knowing what the other considers before they 
use an ethically ambiguous negotiation tactic (EANT) will help negotiators better understand the other 
party and help them manage their emotional responses to being the victim of an EANT.   
This paper explores the ‘what are they thinking?’ aspect of using EANTs.  It presents an 
interpretation of a multi-dimensional scaling analysis using a dataset of ratings of EANTs from a 
population of Australians.  This study adds to our understanding about ethical decision making in 
negotiation by adopting an approach that has not been employed in negotiation ethics research and so 
builds on existing knowledge about demographic differences, cultural distinctions (related to cultural 
value dimensions) and understanding of the influence of contextual variations that have been documented 
by previous researchers.  Interpretation of dimensions that underlie Australian negotiators’ ethical decision 
making in a negotiation context is used to highlight areas for future research endeavours across cultures. 
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Before presenting the details of the sample, methods and the interpretation of the multi-
dimensional scaling analysis, this paper reviews negotiation and business ethics research that informs 
understanding of differences in negotiators’ ethical decision making.  Then four dimensions are presented 
as important considerations for negotiators.  These dimensions are discussed, likely cultural differences 
flagged and future research directions are proposed.     
 
Determinants of negotiators’ ethical decision making 
Before considering research that informs negotiators’ ethical decision making it is necessary to 
first define what it meant by ethics and ‘ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics’ (EANTs) which are 
referred to throughout this paper.  Most people know that ethical decision making entails differentiating 
between right or wrong.  In the business ethics literature ethics are often used interchangeably with the 
term morals.  This switching of terms is correct since both terms have as their basis the Greek roots ethos 
and ta ethika which was then rendered into Latin by Cicero as mores (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).  
The definition of ethics used here is: ‘the rules, standards, codes or principles which provided guidelines 
for the morally right behaviour and truthfulness in specific situations’ (Lewis, 1985).    
The term ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics has emerged as the accepted term in the 
negotiation field.  The meaning of ‘ambiguous’ is ‘doubtful, questionable and open to several possible 
interpretations’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).  If something is ethically ambiguous it means there 
can be multiple understandings of whether it conforms to standards of what is right.  Negotiation is 
generally accepted as being an interaction between two or more parties who are working together to seek 
to resolve incompatible goals (after Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  The word tactic is taken from military 
parlance and is the label given to a manoeuvre in the course of battle.  In a negotiation context it is an 
action or statement used by a negotiator, usually with a view to achieving an aim.  There are a range of 
tactics that negotiators can use in a negotiation.  Pulling all these definitions together, an ethically 
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ambiguous negotiation tactic (EANT) is a manoeuvre used in the course of a negotiation that may be 
regarded as wrong by at least some individuals who participate in or observe the negotiation.   
Negotiations provide an ideal context for researching the ethical decision making process since 
the opportunity to deceive is present in negotiation given the inevitable information asymmetries (Barry & 
Robinson, 2002).  Despite this, and the acknowledged impact of the use of ethically ambiguous 
negotiation tactics on both the negotiation process and outcome (Banas & McLean-Parks, 2002), research 
on the determinants of negotiators’ ethical decision making has been largely restricted to demographic 
factors, situational factors, cultural differences and moral stance.  This section outlines the main findings 
from this literature.  It shows a sizeable gap in our understanding of what negotiators consider in their 
ethical decision making.  It is argued that an interpretive approach is appropriate to investigate the 
underlying considerations.   
The current model of ethical decision making in negotiation neatly summarises how the findings 
of the various empirical studies fit together and this is shown in figure one.   
Much of the empirical research on ethical decision making in negotiation has focussed on 
individual level factors such as age and gender.  There are fairly consistent findings in the negotiation 
literature that women are generally less accepting of EANTs than men and that older people think it less 
appropriate to use EANTs than younger people (Anton, 1990, Robinson & Lewicki, 1998, Volkema, 
1999, 2004 and, Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000).  However, many of the studies have used MBA 
or undergraduate students and so the range of the age in the samples is not very wide.   
Relatively fewer studies have investigated the relationship between motivational orientation or 
personality factors and ethical decision making.  In a study of MBA students, Banas & McLean-Parks 
(2002) found negotiators classified as ideologically ‘absolutist’ (would assume the best outcome can be 
achieved by following universal principals) were less accepting of EANTs than ‘subjectivists’ (negotiators 
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who base decisions on personal values and perspectives).  Barry, Fulmer, & Long (2003) found some 
modest correlation between Machiavellianism and approval of EANTs.   
Five contextual variables are considered influential and are included in Lewicki et al.'s, (1999) 
model of ethical decision making.  These are a) the relationship with the other party; b) the relative power 
of the negotiators; c) whether or not the negotiator is acting as an agent; d) the group and the 
organisational norms, and; e) the cultural norms.  Yet relatively few studies have explored the influence of 
these variables.  
We know that when there is the likelihood of a future long-term relationship with the other party, 
negotiators are less likely to endorse marginally ethical tactics (Lewicki & Spencer, 1991 cited in Lewicki 
et al., 1999) and that people are more likely to deceive a stranger than a friend (Schweitzer & Croson, 
1999).  We also know that there is a link between the relative power of negotiators and the expectation of 
undesirable behaviour (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001) however, the direction of that influence is unclear 
since there are conflicting findings.  On one hand, there is empirical evidence that negotiators with more 
power will use EANTs (bluffing) more than their counterparts with less power (Crott, Kayser, & Lamm, 
1980) and on the other hand, there is evidence that when the negotiator knows there is a power imbalance, 
they will be more open and provide information (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001).  There is also research 
showing that power has no effect at all (Aquino, 1998).   
Negotiation researchers are yet to turn their attention to how the other contextual variables 
influence ethical decision making in a negotiation.  Following Bowie & Freeman’s (1992) work, Lewicki 
et al. (1999) have proposed that when people act as an agent they may be more willing to violate personal 
ethical standards.  While there are numerous studies on the agency relationship in negotiation, no studies 
could be found that specifically addressed agents perceptions of ethicality in a negotiation context.  
Similarly, while the influence of group and organisational norms have received significant coverage in the 
business ethics literature (see Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000, and Ford & Richardson, 1994 for reviews) 
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only one study could be found in a negotiation context.  Aquino (1998) discovered that when ethical 
standards were highly salient, negotiators were significantly less likely to use deception, even when there 
were strong individual incentives to act otherwise.   
Understanding cultural differences in negotiation rule books (or negotiation schema) (Brett & 
Okumura, 1998) is important because of the high cost of international negotiations and the greater 
potential for misunderstanding.  Thus, it is not surprising that there are a considerable number of studies 
that have explored the influence of culture on ethical decision making in negotiation.  While these studies 
have confirmed that there are cross-cultural differences in perceptions of ethicality in negotiations 
(Volkema & Fleury, 2002; Volkema, 1998, 1999,2004; Zarkada-Fraser & Fraser, 2001; Triandis et al., 
2001; Elahee, Kirby, & Nasif, 2002), there is little understanding of what the negotiators are thinking 
about when they evaluate an ethical dilemma or rate the appropriateness of an EANT.  Although we know 
for example that the Mexicans perceive EANTs as less appropriate than US respondents (Volkema, 1998), 
and Brazilians rate EANTs as more appropriate than US respondents (Volkema, 1999) this work has 
focussed on measuring the differences rather than getting behind the decision.   
Previous research on individual and cultural differences in ratings of appropriateness has also 
established that some types of EANT are more acceptable than others.  For example, in their development 
of their typology of EANTs, Robinson et al. (2000) found that EANTs they classified as ‘traditional 
competitive bargaining’ were rated as the most acceptable of their five types in their sample of MBA 
students in the USA.  The least appropriate type of EANT was ‘inappropriate information gathering’ 
where the negotiators were asked to evaluate appropriateness of tactics where, for example, they gain 
information about the other party by paying friends or associates, or gave gifts.  Along the same lines but 
in a comparison across cultures, Volkema (2004) found that EANTs classified as traditional competitive 
behaviours were more acceptable in countries with low power distance than in countries with high power 
distance. 
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While all of the research to date is invaluable in confirming that there are individual level 
differences, cultural differences and that contextual variables are influential in negotiators’ ethical 
decision making, the research can be conceptually extended.  For example, although we know some types 
of EANT are deemed more appropriate than others, we do not know what aspect about the EANT that 
makes it more acceptable.  Is it the particular context that the negotiator is thinking about or is it the likely 
impact on the other party?  The aim of study presented here is to explore this issue and uncover some of 
the dimensions that negotiators consider when rating the appropriateness of an EANT.   
This ‘what are they thinking?’ question is best suited to an interpretative research frame since the 
area is poorly understood.  An interpretative frame infers general patterns of order from empirical data and 
does not impose a priori structures (Parke, 1993).  This is something of a departure from the methods used 
to date in negotiation ethics, and it was concerns over the consistency of results using deductive methods 
that led to the use of multi-dimensional scaling in this study.  The next section discusses previous research 
methodology and concerns arising from it.   
 
Classifying and Measuring Appropriateness of EANTs 
The aim of almost all of the research described in the prior section was to document intergroup 
differences in attitudes towards EANTs.  The most recently published scale to enable investigation of 
differences is the SINS (Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies) scale by Robinson et al., 
(2000).  The SINS scale consists of 16 items that are aggregated into five types of tactics.  The five types 
of tactics identified by Robinson et al. (2000) were: 1) traditional competitive bargaining, 2) attacking an 
opponent’s network, 3) false promises, 4) misrepresentation /lying and 5) inappropriate information 
gathering.  Respondents to an administration of the SINS scale are asked to rate the appropriateness of 
each of the 16 items on a 7-point Likert scale of appropriateness (1= not al all appropriate, 4= somewhat 
appropriate, and 7 = very appropriate).   
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In order to identify the types of EANTs, Robinson et al. (2000) used factor analysis.  The goal of 
factor analysis is two-fold.  First, it seeks to provide parsimony by reducing a larger group of items into a 
smaller number of factors.  Secondly, factor analysis assumes that there is a latent construct that ‘causes’ 
the items to be scored similarly.  In other words, it seeks to identify the underlying processes or factors 
that produce correlations among variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  Factor analysis looks for shared 
co-variance and so, in the case of the SINS scale where the question asked of respondents is ‘how 
appropriate is this tactic’ items that are rated similarly by lots of respondents in any data collection will 
load together on a factor.  This is problematic since the premise underlying the development of the SINS 
scale, and the application of it, is to seek out differences between groups’ ratings of appropriateness, so 
using ratings of shared appropriateness will not produce consistent, or meaningful factor structures.  
Logically, if items co-vary together according to their ratings of perceived appropriateness, and different 
groups have different ideas about how appropriate items are, then different groups will give a different 
factor solution.   
It is easier to think about this proposition if the complexity of the SINS scale is stripped away and 
a simpler study is described.  Imagine a scale with six tactics is administered to two groups with 200 
people in each group.  The members of Group A believe fervently that the ‘ends justify the means’ and 
consistently rate all six tactics at the upper end of the scale (around 7, very appropriate).  Group B on the 
other hand believe that deception is unacceptable and rate the items at the lower end of the scale (1, 2 or 3) 
more or less randomly.  A comparison of the results of a factor analysis from these two data sets is telling.  
The factor analysis on the data from Group A would produce just one factor with all six items loading on 
it.  By comparison, the factor analysis run on the data from Group B would result in more factors 
depending of what items co-varied consistently.  The items in this imaginary research design are co-
varying because the ratings of perceived appropriateness are similar, not because there is some latent 
factor that is causing them to load together, nor because they are different types of tactics.   
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Reviewing studies that have run a factor analysis on ratings of appropriateness of tactics supports 
this contention.  For example, in their development of an earlier version of the scale, Lewicki & Robinson 
(1998) compared the factor structure from three samples of university students.  Examination of the 
published factor loadings shows that 3 of the 18 items do not consistently load onto the same factors 
across the three samples, although the reasons for the differences were not explored in 1998 study.  One 
other study also showed inconsistent factor structures using the Lewicki & Robinson (1998) 18-item scale.  
A cross-cultural study of Brazil (n= 136) and the US (n=135) by Volkema in 1999 included principal 
component analysis (varimax rotation).  Volkema found different factor structures.  Only 15 of the 18 
items loaded as expected for the US sample and 12 of the 18 items loaded as expected from the Brazilian 
sample (Volkema, 1999), however it is noted that the sample size for each culture is quite small for a 
factor analysis and this likely influenced the resultant factor structure.   
If it is accepted that factor analysis of data that asks the ‘how appropriate is this tactic?’ question 
will produce inconsistent results across groups of negotiators, it begs the question of what method should 
be used to investigate the constructs that are considered in ethical decision making?  Multi-dimensional 
scaling (MDS) offers a method that can identify the dimensions underlying ratings of appropriateness of 
EANTs although it is important to note that MDS dimensions are not going to be causal as a factor 
analysis would produce.  Nonmetric MDS is more flexible than factor analysis.  This is because 
exploratory factor analysis is limited to the analysis of correlation coefficients (Livneh, Livneh, Maron, & 
Kaplan, 1996) and because it is easier to interpret distances among points than angles between vectors as 
is required in factor analysis.   
However, the MDS analysis was not run on data collected using the SINS scale.  Following 
concerns about the appropriateness of identifying a typology of EANTs via factor analysis, the nature of 
the items in the SINS types were examined in more detail and a number of other concerns arose.  It was 
concluded that the items in the each of the factor ‘types’ were not conceptually distinct (this was because 
they were related by appropriateness) and that the SINS scale did not offer content adequacy of the field 
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of EANTs.  Further, some the tactics in the SINS scale include motivation as well as tactic description and 
that some of the EANTs in the SINS scale extended beyond a negotiation.   
These concerns led to the decision that it was necessary to consider some of the types of EANTs 
that are absent in the SINS scale.  For example there is only one item in the SINS scale that could be 
considered a sin of omission.  An investigation of the business ethics literature, most notably the deceptive 
communication literature (for example McCornack's (1992) information manipulation theory) and the 
workplace deviance literature (for example, Robinson & Bennett, 1995 and Scott & Jehn, 1999) resulted 
in the development of a new typology of EANTs.  This was the first step in the development of a new 
inventory of EANTs to be used to study differences in ratings of appropriateness.  
A new inventory of EANTs called the HAATTIN (How Appropriate Are These Tactics In 
Negotiation) inventory was developed over a number of months using coders to check the classification of 
EANTs into the types developed from the literature.  The coding exercise began with 9 types and 75 
EANTs collected from academic literature and practitioner lists.  Three rounds of coding involving 
successive clarification of the wording of the EANTs and culling of the types and resulted in the collation 
of 24 items under 8 types of EANTs.  The eight types are: 1) withhold information from the other party, 2) 
make promises that are not sincere, 3) threaten the other party, 4) use or say untruthful information but not 
as a threat or as a promise, 5) use positive feelings toward the other party, 6) use negative emotions / 
feelings toward the other party, 7) intentionally unsettle or wear the other party down but not by threats or 
by lying, and 8) divert attention of the other party away from the current negotiation.   
A copy of the 24 EANTs in the HAATTIN inventory, under each of the eight types is given in 
table one.  The item numbers refer to the order in which they appear in the HAATTIN inventory.  The 
HAATTIN inventory represents the initial step in the development of a new scale and is currently being 
developed further and is being tested in other countries.   
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Methods 
The HAATTIN inventory with ratings of appropriateness was completed by 135 Australians 
contacted through the authors’ business network.  The average age of respondents was 34.8 years with the 
range from 16 to 72 years.  Average work experience was 16.1 years.  53% (71) of the sample were 
female and 47% (65) of the sample were male.  Because the influence of culture on ethical decision 
making is of interest and Australia is a multi-cultural society, sampling was limited to Australians who 
were attended high-school in Australia and spoke English at home.   
In order to identify the underlying dimensions of the ratings of appropriateness of the EANTs, 
data were submitted to multidimensional (MDS) analysis using ALSCAL (SPSS, 2002).  Two-, three-, 
four-, five- and six-dimensional solutions of the 24 HAATTIN items were explored.  A four-dimensional 
solution was deemed most appropriate based on goodness of fit measures: Kruskal’s stress values, with 
values closer to zero indicating a better fit with the solution and the squared correlations coefficient (R2) 
with values closer to 1.00 indicating a better fit with the solution (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).  The four-
dimensional solution yielded the following fits: Stress = .11436, R2 = .88739.  Interpretability was also an 
important consideration in determining the number of appropriate dimensions in an MDS analysis 
(Kruskal & Wish, 1978). 
To interpret dimensions, the location of each EANT relative to the other EANTs was examined.  
First, EANT groupings at each extreme of the dimension were examined and the extreme groupings were 
contrasted with each other to hypothesise a dimension.  The EANTs sitting in the middle of each 
dimension were studied to see if their position fit the hypothesised dimension.   
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Interpretation of Dimensions 
This section describes the four dimensions identified.  The dimensions were labelled 1) 
immediacy; 2) impression management; 3) emotional commitment; and, 4) signal strength.  The 
distributions of EANTs on these dimensions are shown in figures two and three.  The figures also show 
clusters of the eight HAATTIN types.  Following description of the interpreted dimensions, the 
distribution of the HATTIN types is discussed.   
The first MDS dimension (D1) is labelled ‘immediacy’.  EANTs are arrayed across a continuum 
according to how quickly the impact of the EANT is felt by the other party.  At the negative end of the 
continuum are EANTs that would be felt in the future, such as ‘promises to reward the other party at a 
future date’ and ‘say you will use negative personal information to the other party’s detriment’.  At the 
positive end of the continuum are EANTs that are either executed immediately or have an immediate 
impact.  For example, ‘pretend you are delighted’, ‘send two demands with deadlines’ and ‘change 
negotiators’.   
The second MDS dimension (D2) is labelled ‘impression management’.  EANTs are arrayed 
according to whether they give a good impression of the negotiator to the other party or a negative 
impression.  At the positive end of the continuum are EANTs that give the impression the negotiator is 
‘nice’ such as ‘emphasizing only the positives’, ‘keep negative information to yourself’ and the positive 
emotion tactics such as ‘pretend I am delighted’ and ‘express sympathy with the other party’.  At the 
negative end of the impression management dimension are EANTs that use negative emotions such as 
‘pretend to be disgusted at a comment from the other party’, ‘act angry’ and the EANT ‘tell the other party 
that you will never do business with them again’.   
The third MDS dimension (D3) is labelled ‘emotional investment’.  At the positive end of the 
scale are EANTs that require emotional commitment to deliver them convincingly.  At the negative end of 
the scale, EANTs that require less commitment or are acts of omission.  For example, at the positive end 
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of the continuum are EANTs such as ‘pretend I am delighted about something the other party said’, ‘tell 
them that you will never do business again if they do not provide an answer’.  These tactics require a 
negotiator to show a level of passion or the tactic will not seem convincing.  At the negative end of the 
continuum, EANTs that do not require emotional commitment from the negotiator are located.  For 
example, ‘change negotiators’, ‘keep negative information to self’ and ‘threaten to leave permanently’.  It 
can be envisaged that these tactics can be delivered in a disinterested or uncommitted way.   
The fourth MDS dimension (D4) is labelled ‘signal strength’ according to how easy it is for the 
other party to read the intent of the message.  EANTs are arrayed according to whether the message in the 
EANT is explicit and strongly communicated or whether the message is implicit and indirectly 
communicated.  At the positive end of the continuum are EANTs, the meaning of which is easy to 
understand, such as ‘send two demands with deadlines’ and ‘respond with enthusiasm’.  At the other end 
of the continuum are EANTs where the meaning is less clear, such as ‘keep repeating demands over and 
over’ and ‘do not tell the other party information that would be helpful to them’.   
Examination of the clustering of the EANT types also informed interpretation of the dimensions.  
The discussion below describes the distribution of each type on the MDS dimensions.   
Type 1, withholding information clusters most tightly on the plot of dimensions 3 and 4 and is 
shown on figure 3.  On D1, immediacy, and D2, impression management, the items are all in the quadrant 
of immediate / soon impact and a positive impression.  On D3, emotional investment, the items are at the 
lower end and require little emotional investment.  The three items cover a range on D4, signal strength 
from a moderately weak signal with item 17 (do not tell the other party information that would be helpful 
to them) to a moderate strong signal with item 1 (say things that emphasise only the positives).   
The distribution of the items is supportive of the interpretation of the dimensions.  Intuitively, it 
makes sense that EANTs that withhold information are tactics that influence the other party in the near 
term and give a positive rather than negative impression to the other party since the other party will not 
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necessarily know the EANT was used.  The emotional investment required to execute such tactics would 
be low since these are often EANTs that are ‘sins of omission’ rather than commission.  Lastly, the 
distribution on the signal strength dimension is intuitively appealing as not telling the other party 
information (item 17) is a much weaker signal to the other party than item 1 where statements about 
positive aspects are made to the other party and the distribution on this dimension accords with this.   
Items in type 2, making promises that are not sincere, cluster tightly on both plots and are shown 
on both.  On the first plot of dimensions 1 and 2, the items cluster at the future end of the immediacy 
dimension and around the middle of the impression management dimension.  On the plot of dimensions 2 
and 3, the items are clustering tightly in the quadrant that represents strong emotional investments and a 
strong signal, although the cluster is at near the mid-point of both dimensions.   
The location of these two clusters is supportive of the interpretation of the dimensions since 
promises are usually something that occur in the future and are by their promissory nature, a positive 
rather than negative thing to say to the other party and so should give a positive impression.  The 
characteristics of the EANTs accord with their position on these two dimensions.  Similarly, false 
promises require a moderate to strong level of emotional commitment to execute and it might be 
anticipated that they would be received as a strong rather than weak signal by the other party.  Thus the 
positioning of the EANTs on these dimensions supports the interpretation of the dimensions.   
Items in type 3, threaten the other party, are distributed widely across D1 (immediacy) and D3 
(level of emotional investment).  All three of the EANTs are in the negative quadrants of D2, representing 
negative impressions and are distributed around the middle of D4 which suggests they are viewed as 
neither a strong or weak signal.  The distribution of the type is plotted on figure 3.   
The wide distribution of threats across two of dimensions suggests that may be sub-types of 
threats according to these dimensions.  For example, the distribution across the immediacy dimension 
(D1) suggests that threats might be conceptualised by negotiators according to whether they will have an 
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immediate impact or a future impact.  Similarly, the distribution of threats across the emotional investment 
dimension (D3) suggests that some threats are easier to deliver than others and that sub-categories could 
be derived by asking negotiators about ease of delivery of threats.  It would be worth investigating if there 
is a relationship between the immediacy dimension and the emotional investment dimension to ratings of 
appropriateness.   
The three EANTs in type 4, use or say untruthful information but not as a threat or promise, 
cluster tightly on the plot of dimension 1 and 2 as shown in figure 2  On these dimensions they are located 
in the quadrant of future impact and positive impressions.  On the plot of dimensions 3 and 4 they are 
widely distributed across both emotional investment dimension and the strength of signal dimension.   
The distribution of the three EANTs on D4 (signal strength) are counter-intuitive with item 4, 
telling the other party something that I have made up falling at the weaker signal strength end compared 
with items 19 (provide statistical misinformation) and 10 (leave untrue information that supports my 
position in a place where the other party could find it) which are both stronger signals.  A possible 
explanation is that written words carry more ‘clout’ and the element of discovery (i.e. the belief by the 
other party that they have ‘found’ information that they were not meant to find) make the untruth more 
believable for the receiver.  Further research is required to test the idea that the mode of delivery of the 
EANT influences how believable the tactic is to the other party.   
The spread of items on the dimension 3 and 4 also points to the possibility that negotiators have 
sub-categories of untruthful information.  These could be identified by research that surveys negotiators 
about how much emotional investment is required to execute an EANT or by asking them about how 
strongly they think the message is received.   
Type 5 is use positive feeling toward the other party.  As shown in figure 2, the three items in 
this type (items 5, 13 and 20) cluster tightly on the plot of D1 and D2 in the quadrant of immediate impact 
and positive impressions.  The three types are more widely distributed on the plot of D3 and D4 but still 
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falling mostly in the quadrant representing the need to invest a strong emotional investment and are a 
strong signal to the other party.  The distribution of these items along the dimensions makes intuitive 
sense and supports the labelling of the dimensions.  Using a positive emotion is generally intended to have 
an immediate impact, make a positive impression on the other party, would require a level of emotion to 
come across as convincing and would probably be sent with the belief that it was a strong signal.   
The distribution of the three items in type 6, use negative emotions / feeling towards the other 
party, also clusters tightly on the plot of D1 and D2 and is shown in figure 2.  Like the positive emotion 
tactics above, these items are at the ‘immediate impact’ end of D1 but at the negative impression end of 
the D2 distribution.  This is consistent with the negative nature of the EANTs.  On the plot of D3 and D4, 
the items are clustering around the middle of the emotional investment dimension (D3) and range from 
moderately strong signal (item 22, act angry) to a weak signal (item 7, pretend to be disgusted at a 
comment from the other party).  The perceived strength of EANTs that use negative emotions / feelings 
may be a way of discriminating between sub-groups of this type if future research moves in this direction.   
Items in type 7, intentionally unsettle or wear the other party down but not by threats or 
lying, are also shown on the plot of D1 versus D2 (figure 2).  All these EANTs have high immediacy and 
are at the positive end of D1.  While at the negative impression end of D2, the items cover a range of 
degrees of negative impressions which suggests that there may be sub-categories of this type.  These three 
items are widely distributed on D3 and D4 which also suggests there may be different sub-categories 
within this type.  It may be that negotiators rate these EANTs according to how much emotional 
investment is required to execute the EANT.   
The clusters of the final type of EANT, type 8: divert attention of the other party away from 
the current negotiation is shown on both figures.  The distribution of EANTs on D1 (immediacy) 
supports the interpretation of the dimension with item 15, introduce imaginary issues as less immediate 
than item 8, appear to move in one direction to divert the other party’s attention.  The EANTs fall in the 
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middle to negative impression part of D2.  The distribution of items on the plot of D1 versus D2 suggests 
that there may be sub-categories of this type where negotiators rate appropriateness according to how 
negative the impression is that is created and the immediacy.  The items cluster more tightly on the D3 
versus D4 plot and are close to other EANTs types.  The items cluster around the low or withholding end 
of the emotional investment dimension (D3) and around the middle of the signal strength dimension.   
 
Considerations for Negotiators and Future Research Directions 
Based on this interpretation, it is hypothesised that four dimensions underlie this Australian data 
set.  Negotiator’s decision to rate an EANT as appropriate or not include consideration of: 
• the immediacy of impact of an EANT; 
• the impression using an EANT gives to the other party;  
• the level of emotional commitment that is required to execute an EANT; and  
• how clearly the intended signal will be communicated to the other party.   
This section of the paper discusses how identification of these dimensions informs understanding 
of negotiators’ ethical decision making processes and discusses likely cultural differences in these 
dimensions.  Future research directions are also discussed.   
Firstly, the nature of the first two dimensions suggests that the consequence of using EANTs is a 
prime consideration for negotiators.  Both dimension 1 and 2 are related to the consequence on the other 
party.  By referring to figure one where the current model of ethical decision making is shown, it can be 
seen that although included in the model, consequences are secondary to the decision to use an EANT and 
form a feedback loop for thinking about subsequent use of EANTs.  However, the interpretation of the 
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data here suggests that consequences are considered in the evaluation of the appropriateness of EANTs 
and not only after an EANT has been executed.   
The questions that this raises for future research are numerous.  For example, what consequences 
(or type of consequences) have the most impact on the use of EANTs?  How do different negotiation 
situations influence the assessment of consequences?  For example, intuitively it seems likely that 
consequences of actions would be of less concern for negotiators involved in a one-off sales negotiation 
than for negotiators who are engaged in joint-venture negotiations.   
When thinking about cross-cultural negotiation, the importance of each of the dimensions in terms 
of the consequences of use of EANTs is even more significant.  The Australian sample’s responses 
analysed here point to the immediacy of effect (D1) being important.  Given that there are cultural 
differences in how time is understood (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998; Hall, 1959) it is logical 
that there may be cultural differences in this dimension.  Negotiators from countries such as the US who 
are see time more in the short-term than negotiators from countries like Hong Kong (Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998) may prefer the use of EANTs that give immediate results.  Cross-cultural 
comparative studies would be required to establish if this is the case.   
With respect to D2, impression management, it is also likely that there will be cross-cultural 
differences.  There are well established differences in face-giving across cultures (Ting-Toomey et al. 
1991) and it is likely that this consideration of this dimensions will be especially important in countries 
where face-giving is practiced.  It may be that EANTs that give a negative impression would be used less 
by negotiators from such countries (in Asia) compared with negotiators from the Western cultures where 
face is less important.  For example, the EANT ‘pretend to be disgusted at a comment from the other 
party’ might be considered less appropriate by a Japanese negotiator than by an Australian negotiator.   
Impression management is also related to relationship building and similar cross-cultural 
differences are anticipated.  Negotiators from cultures that value relationships highly, such as the Southern 
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American cultures (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998) may be less approving of EANTs that do not 
provide a positive impression than negotiators from cultures that are not as relationship focussed, like the 
USA.  Future research across numerous diverse cultures is needed to test these two propositions.   
Identification of the dimension impression management raises other questions about ethical 
decision making that could be investigated in future studies.  How much do negotiators think about the 
impression they are giving when selecting or rating the appropriateness of EANTs?  Do EANTs that 
provide a positive impression get used more than EANTs that give a negative impression?  Do negotiators 
modify their use of negative impression-giving EANTs according to how close they are to the other party, 
or how well established their reputation is?   
Dimensions 3 and 4 were both concerned with the communication aspects of the EANT – how 
much emotional energy is required to use the EANT and whether the EANT will be understood by the 
other party.  Both of these dimensions can be related to the cultural value dimension of high-low context 
that was identified by Hall (1959).  Negotiators from high context cultures like Japan use a lot of 
implication in their communication whereas Australians are renowned for saying exactly what they are 
thinking and mean and so are deemed to be low-context communicators.  Intuitively, perceptions of signal 
strength would vary according to whether the sender was high or low context and this dimension may not 
be apparent in data from other cultures.   
The emotional commitment dimensions (D3) can be related to Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner’s 
(1998) dimension of affectivity. Negotiators from some cultures like Japan are emotionally neutral, or 
unlikely to display emotion and negotiators from other cultures such as Spain and France are relatively 
affective, or highly approving of displays of emotion (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  Ratings 
of appropriateness of EANTs may be related to levels of emotional commitment and these may be 
different across cultures.  For example, it is likely that negotiators from highly affective cultures might be 
much more approving of EANTs that require emotional commitment than negotiators from relatively 
   20 
neutral cultures.  As with the other dimensions, a systematic cross-cultural research program could 
investigate these propositions.   
Considering D4 in the Australian, low context communication situation, it is noteworthy that 
Western researchers have linked the strength and accuracy of receiving a signal to beliefs about the 
sender’s reputation (Prahbu & Stewart, 2001).  This link points to another avenue of future research that 
investigates how well-communicated EANTs influence understanding of reputation.  How does the use of 
EANTs influence negotiators’ reputation?  
 
Conclusions 
In sum, the use of a multi-dimensional scaling analysis on ratings of ethically ambiguous 
negotiation tactics has provided new insight into the considerations that are important for negotiators.  The 
four dimensions that are important for Australian negotiators are the immediacy of impact of a tactic, the 
impression that use of the tactic gives to the other side, the emotional investment that is required for 
execution of the tactic and lastly, the perceived strength of signal of the tactic.   
Although this study was restricted to Australian negotiators, knowledge of the cultural value 
dimension of Australians has allowed informed speculation about likely cultural differences in the 
importance of the MDS dimensions in other cultures and the inter-relationship between the MDS 
dimensions, culture and rating of appropriateness of EANTs.  It was proposed that cultural differences in 
how time is understood, the importance of face and relationships, the explicitness of communication style 
and the acceptability of emotion in communication are going to be important in accounting for differences 
in appropriateness of EANTs in negotiations.   
Identification of these dimensions can be used by negotiators in their evaluation of the 
appropriateness of EANTs.  For example, if negotiating with a time-conscious negotiator from the US, a 
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negotiator might decide that the use of immediate EANTs, such as sending two demands with timelines, 
might not cause negotiation breakdown.  Similarly, if future research confirms that EANTs that are 
damaging to face and relationships are less acceptable in cultures like China, negotiators can avoid using 
EANTs that result in a negative impression.  Identification of the four MDS dimensions provides 
negotiators with a list of what they need to be mindful of in evaluating the likely impact of EANTs.   
The identification of the MDS dimensions has also uncovered numerous new avenues for future 
research.  Most importantly perhaps, this study highlights the need for more work across cultures to 
explore the dimensions that underlie negotiators’ ethical decisions.  Data collection and analysis is 
currently underway in the Peoples’ Republic of China and from Holland.  It is anticipated that the results 
of these studies will inform some of the many questions identified from this study.   
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Figure 1: Model of Ethical Decision Making in Negotiation  
Explanations & justifications
Lewicki’s Model of Ethical Decision Making
Consequences:
1. Impact of tactic:
does it work?
2. Self evaluation
3. Feedback and
reaction from other
negotiator,
constituency, and
audiences
Influence
situation
Identification
of a range of
influence
tactics
Selection and
use of a
deceptive
tactic
Intentions and motives
for using deceptive
tactics
Contextual factors
Relationship with opponent
Relative power
Acting as agent
Groups and organizational norms
Cultural norms
Individual differences
Demographic factors
Personality characteristics
Motivational orientation
Moral development
 
Source: (Lewicki et al., 1999) 
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Figure 2: MDS Map of EANTs Dimension 1 (Immediacy) Versus Dimension 2 (Impression 
Management) 
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 Figure 3: MDS Map of EANTs Dimension 3 (Emotional Investment) Versus Dimension 4 (Signal 
Strength) 
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Table 1: Ethically Ambiguous Negotiation Tactics in the HAATTIN Inventory Categorised Under 
Type 
 
Type 1: Withhold information from the other party 
1. Say things to the other party that emphasise only the positive aspects of my position and don’t mention negatives 
11. Keep negative information to myself 
17.  Do not tell the other party information that would help his/her position 
 
Type 2: Make Promises that are not sincere 
2.  Say I will give concessions in the future, in return for concessions from the other party now, even if I will not 
follow through. 
9.  Promise to reward the other party at some future date, although I will not follow through on the promise 
18.  Say good things will happen to the other party if he/she gives me what I want now, even if I won’t deliver it 
 
Type 3: Threaten the Other Party 
3.  Say that I will use negative personal information about the other party to their detriment, although I am just 
bluffing 
12.  Threaten to leave the negotiation permanently unless the other party offers me some concessions now, even 
though I will stay 
21.  Tell the other party that if they do not answer my request by a deadline that I will never do business with them 
again 
 
Type 4: Use or say untruthful information but not as a threat or as a promise 
4.  Tell the other party something that I have made up to make my position appear stronger 
10.  Leave untrue information that supports my position in a place where the other party could find it. 
19.  Provide statistical misinformation that supports my case. 
 
Type 5: Use positive feelings toward the other party  
5.  Pretend that I am delighted about something the other party said. 
13.  Respond with enthusiasm to a remark from the other party even if I am not enthusiastic. 
20.  Express sympathy with the other party’s plight although I do not care. 
 
Type 6: Use negative emotions / feelings towards the other party 
7.  Pretend to be disgusted at a comment from the other party. 
16.  Act as though I am very disappointed with how things are going. 
22.  Act as though I am very angry about the situation. 
 
Type 7: Intentionally unsettle or wear the other party down but not by threats or by lying 
6.  Keep repeating my demands over and over. 
14.  Change negotiators to throw the other party off balance. 
23.  Send two demands with time deadlines. 
 
Type 8: Divert attention of the other party away from the current negotiation 
8.  Appear to move in one direction to divert the other party’s attention from my real goal. 
15.  Introduce imaginary issues into the negotiation to disguise my real intentions 
24.  Give the other party lots of detailed information to overwhelm them. 
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